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Abstract—Testability of digital ICs (Integrated Circuits) rely
on the principle of controllability and observability. Adopting
conventional techniques like scan-chains open up avenues for
attacks, and hence cannot be adopted in a straight-forward man-
ner for security chips. Furthermore, testing becomes incredibly
challenging for the promising class of hardware security primi-
tives, called PUFs (Physically Unclonable Functions), which offer
unique properties like unclonability, unpredictibility, uniformity,
uniqueness, and yet easily computable. However, the definition of
PUF itself poses a challenge on test engineers, simply because it
has no golden response for a given input, often called challenge.
In this paper, we develop a novel test strategy considering
that the fabrication of a batch of N > 1 PUFs is equivalent
to drawing random instances of Boolean mappings. We hence
model the PUFs as black-box Boolean functions of dimension
m × 1, and show combinatorially that random designs of such
m×1 functions exhibit correlation-spectra which can be used to
characterize random and thus good designs of PUFs. We first
develop theoretical results to quantize the correlation values,
and subsequently the expected number of pairs of such Boolean
functions which should belong to a given spectra. In addition
to this, we show through extensive experimental results that
a randomly chosen sample of such PUFs also resemble the
correlation-spectra property of the overall PUF population.
Interestingly, we show through experimental results on 50 FPGAs
that when the PUFs are infected by faults the usual randomness
tests for the PUF outputs such as uniformity, fail to detect any
aberration. However, the spectral-pattern is clearly shown to get
affected, which we demonstrate by standard statistical tools for
hypothesis testing used to detect whether two distributions are
different, such as Welsh’s t-test. We finally propose a systematic
testing framework for the evaluation of PUFs by observing the
correlation-spectra of the PUF instances under test.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the inherent challenge of producing clones physi-
cally or characterizing mathematical circuit models, Physically
Unclonable Functions (PUF) are widely adopted in secure
devices to act primarily as the fingerprint in those devices [5].
Typically, a PUF (first proposed in [11]) is built over the notion
of a one-way function embedded in a physical device and has
been an active topic of research for many years. In order to
develop highly secure and reliable PUF variants, a lot of works
have been conducted on various aspects of PUFs ranging
from creating metrics for quality evaluation to understand the
intricacies of its internal circuit structure [6], [9].
PUF maps an input, also known as the challenge to a unique
and random output, also known as the response. Ideally, such
challenge-response mapping, is unique for every PUF instance
and independent of each other. This unique relationship is at-
tributed from the uncontrollable manufacturing varieties which
bring in unpredictable variations in its internal circuit. For
instance, in delay-based PUFs [5], the uniqueness property is
dependent on the propagation delay of signal through various
paths of the individual circuit components. Relying on the
uniqueness property of PUFs, many security solutions have
been developed, such as PUF based RFID [1], authentication
of devices [15], cryptographic key generation [8]. Besides,
the unique nature of PUF has also been exploited in various
security protocols [13], [14]. Delvaux et. al. [3] provides a
detailed overview of all protocols using strong PUFs.
Due to the widespread use of PUFs as a promising security
measure, it becomes imperative to develop a testing mecha-
nism to ensure its correct functionality. Unlike other hardware
circuits, traditional testing mechanisms such as delay tests or
stuck-at-fault tests are not relevant in case of PUFs. The basic
idea behind structural tests is to compare the output of the
component under test against a known correct output, which
is not available in case of PUFs. As the response of a PUF
is ideally non deterministic, estimating the golden response of
any PUF instance is impossible and impractical. In [16], it has
been shown that properties such as uniformity gets affected on
inducing a fault. However during testing we observed that a
one-bit stuck-at fault does not always have an effect on the first
set of properties such as uniqueness as shown in Table II. To
counter these issues, we have proposed a behavioural testing
mechanism that certifies a PUF to be functionally correct using
statistical analysis of responses of a collection of PUFs that
are known to be correct.
The challenge and response behavior of a PUF can be
thought of as a Boolean mapping, fPUF : C → R, where
C = {0, 1}n is a n-bit challenge and R = {0, 1}m is a m-bit
response. A set of challenge response pairs or CRPs uniquely
define the behavior of an instance. The strength of a PUF can
be determined based on the number of CRPs it admits1. Since
PUFs can be considered to be black-box Boolean functions,
all the properties of Boolean functions become inherent to
PUFs. It is well established that Boolean functions exhibit
correlation, indicating the inter-relationship among Boolean
functions [10]. Due to such correlation properties of Boolean
functions, random choices of Boolean functions, which are
realized as PUFs also should ideally manifest such corre-
1Satisfying an exponential number of CRPs categorizes a PUF to be a
strong PUF.
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lations. Such characteristics may actually form a basis for
testability of a given sample of PUFs, which otherwise may
be infeasible to test individually as PUFs ideally have no
describable functionality (as then we have a mathematical
model!). Furthermore, faults inside a PUF circuitry may not
be detected by the standard metrics like uniformity or other
randomness tests, while correlation analysis may form a novel
basis for testing a given sample of PUF designs. This work
articulates the idea of PUF testability based on correlation
properties of Boolean functions.
There are some well-defined functions [17] to measure
correlations of Boolean functions, such as Pearson correlation
function, auto-correlation function etc. Moreover, some of
the previous works explores the similarity among PUFs. In
[7], analysis of PUF responses has been done using Welsh’s
t-test and PUF responses are categorized on the basis of
its first order and second order moments. Other existing
approaches explore the uniqueness and quality of PUFs based
on querying the identifiers generated by the PUFs either by
computing the entropy of the identifiers [12] (high entropy
reveals better randomness) or by determining the number of
collisions among the identifiers [9] (fewer the collisions better
the randomness). Though there are online and embedded tests
to determine the reliability/ steadiness as well as diffuseness2
of PUFs, however embedded tests are not suitable to assess
the randomness, unpredictability and uniqueness properties.
Later, statistical randomness tests [4] are also conducted with
specific CRP identifiers as test indicators.
With the growing deployment of PUF-based solutions, pro-
viding appropriate testability measures for PUFs leveraging
their functional correlations is an important requirement now-
a-days. There is also dearth of formal methods in exploiting
the uniqueness feature for PUFs. Our work is an enabler in
this domain. The primary contributions of this work are:
• We analyze PUFs as black-box random Boolean functions
and formally establish a correlation-spectra.
• We theoretically quantize the correlation values and the
expected number of pairs of Boolean functions which will
belong to a specified correlation-spectra.
• We show that the correlation-spectra is an indicative of
randomness in designs and hence can categorize good
PUF designs.
• Through extensive experimental results on PUFs, we
study the deviation in correlation-spectra for a PUF, when
infected with faults and hence use this to develop a novel
test strategy for PUF designs.
The test proposal for PUFs is effective as it does not
characterize the functionality of a PUF, which is by definition
unpredictable. Rather it attempts to measure the inherent ran-
domness spirit of PUFs by modeling them as random instances
of Boolean functions. Hence, the technique is capable of
detecting faults which are otherwise undetected upon analysis
of PUF response quality measures, like uniqueness etc. Ad-
2Diffuseness refers to a property of PUFs where PUF’s response to a
challenge is unrelated to the challenge.
ditionally, we show through experiments that the correlation-
spectra is indeed able to capture such aberrations in the PUF
circuitry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the necessary background of PUF and properties
of Boolean functions. We describe our problem in Section III
and also present the uniqueness and testability measures in
more detail. Section IV shows the experimental setup and our
findings with PUFs. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present an introductory explanation of a
PUF and illustrate few relevant properties of Boolean functions
which shall be used for our analysis in subsequent sections.
Here, the vectors are denoted by a bold lowercase character,
e.g., x and matrices are denoted by a bold uppercase character,
e.g., X.
A. Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)
1) Properties of PUF: An ideal PUF, fPUF : C → R,
exhibits certain properties which are as follows:
• Evaluable: fPUF evaluates in polynomial time.
• Unique: fPUF mapping is instance-specific.
• Reproducible: If ci = cj (∀ ci, cj ∈ C), then |fPUF (ci)−
fPUF (cj)| < ∆ (distance).
• Unclonable: It is impossible to construct another gPUF :
C → R, where gPUF ≈ fPUF .
• Unpredictable: Given U = {(ci, ri) | ri = fPUF (ci)},
it is impossible to predict a response rz = fPUF (cz),
where cz is a random challenge and (cz, rz) /∈ U .
• One-way: Applying a challenge c, drawn from a uniform
distribution on {0, 1}n, we obtain r = fPUF (c) so
that Prob[A(fPUF (c)) = c] < 1p(n) , where p(·) is any
positive polynomial. The probability that any probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm or physical procedure A can
output c itself is negligible.
2) An Example PUF (5-4 DAPUF): 5-4 DAPUF (5-4
Double Arbiter PUF), introduced in [2] is a delay-based PUF
consisting of five equal length delay chains, followed by
twenty arbiters and four XOR gates, as shown in Figure 1.
An input challenge c is applied to each chain. The outcome
of these five chains is then fed into arbiters which results in
twenty intermediate outcomes. Each XOR gate takes 5 of these
outcomes and produces 1-bit output as shown in equations of
Figure 1 to produce a 4-bit response r.
5-4 DAPUF, being a delay based PUF, exploits the dif-
ference of propagation delay accumulated over all switches
in each chain. The XOR gates at the last level makes the
circuit non-linear. The uniformity for the four response bits are
44.6%, 54.9%, 43.4% and 40.9%, respectively which makes
it a good candidate for analysis.
B. Boolean functions and its properties
1) Representation of Boolean functions: A Boolean func-
tion B : Vm → GF (2) of m variables is represented by a
Boolean row vector b = 〈b0, b1, . . . b2m〉 of size 2m, which is
Fig. 1. Schematic Representation of a 5-4 DAPUF (adopted from [2])
basically the truth table of Bm. The value at the i-th index of
b denotes the output of B, when the binary equivalent of i is
given as input. For m variables, there can be a total of 22
m
possible functions. These 22
m
functions are represented by a
matrix F of dimension 22
m × 2m, where jth row stores the
truth table of function Bj . Another way to represent a Boolean
function is by a vector of the form {−1, 1}2m , also known as
polarity truth table or sequence of a function.
2) Correlation analysis of Boolean functions: There are
various measures to assess similarity among Boolean functions
– correlation being one of them. Since we have represented
a Boolean function B by a Boolean vector b, calculating
correlation between two vectors f and g is equivalent to
calculating correlation between the corresponding Boolean
functions F and G. One of the well known correlation func-
tions is autocorrelation function ∆ which measures similarity
of a function F with the same function after displacement α
as,
∆(α) =
∑
x∈Vm
F(x)F(x⊕ α) (1)
Similarly for a pair of functions F and G, the cross
correlation function is defined as,
C(F ,G)(α) =
∑
x∈Vm
F(x)G(x⊕ α) (2)
In this work, for any pair of functions, F and G, we calculate
correlation coefficients using their binary representations f and
g as follows,
C(f, g) =
∑
x∈Vm(−1)f(x)⊕g(x)
|Vm| (3)
Correlation coefficient is calculated for every pair of func-
tions F and G as per Equation 3, by picking every two row
vectors from matrix F, and the result is stored in a correlation
matrix. Generating the histogram for the correlation matrix
gives us the correlation spectrum. It is a curve denoting
the number of functions pairs having the same correlation
coefficient. It is be noted that the total number of pairs can
be split into (2m + 1) buckets depending upon the number
of bit mismatches between truth table vectors f and g. Thus,
corresponding to each bucket, there will be one correlation
coefficient. For small values of m, we get discrete correlation
segments as shown in Figure 2. As the size of the input
will increase, the spectra will start to resemble a continuous
spectrum. Given the number of mismatches, two things can be
calculated – (a) the correlation coefficient value, and (b) the
number of pairs falling in the corresponding correlation coef-
ficient bucket, whose derivations are given in Section III-A.
(a) for m = 3 (b) for m = 4
Fig. 2. Correlation-spectra of m-variable Boolean Functions
C. Statistical Tests
1) Welsh’s t-test: Welsh’s t-test is a hypothesis testing
method where a null hypothesis denotes that the mean of the
two input distributions for the test are same. Let D1 and D2
be two input distributions with sizes n1 and n2, means µ1 and
µ2 and variances σ1 and σ2. The t-value is given by,
t =
µ1 − µ2√
σ12
n1
+ σ2
2
n2
(4)
2) Kullback-Leibler Divergence: Kullback-Leibler Diver-
gence is a measure of divergence of one distribution from
a reference distribution. Smaller divergence value indicates
that the first distribution is closely similar to the reference
distribution and a larger value indicates a significant distinction
among the two. It is to be noted that the divergence value
will be different if the reference distribution is changed. For
discrete distributions P and Q, Kullback-Leibler Divergence
from Q to P is mathematically represented by
DKL(Q||P) =
∑
i
Q(i)ln
(Q(i)
P(i)
)
(5)
III. DERIVING CORRELATION-SPECTRA FOR PUFS
In this section, we develop a novel test strategy considering
that the fabrication of a batch of N > 1 PUFs is equivalent
to drawing random instances of Boolean mappings. We first
derive the correlation-spectra of the Boolean functions and
show that this spectra is also exhibited for a random sample
of Boolean functions. We use this observation subsequently as
a template of correct functionality for PUFs.
A. Correlation Analysis of PUFs
We show that PUFs which are essentially random Boolean
functions must exhibit a correlation-spectra, which is inherent
from Boolean theory. We first illustrate the correlation prop-
erties for a toy example, with the number of inputs being 3.
Example 1: Let us consider a 3-variable Boolean function
B(x1, x2, x3). Given 3 input variables, total number of possi-
ble input combinations are 23 = 8 and total number of possible
functions are 22
3
= 256. Each function is represented by a row
vector of length 8. Let us consider two vectors f = 〈10000000〉
and g = 〈10000001〉, representing two Boolean functions
F and G respectively. Using Equation ( 3), the correlation
coefficient for this pair of Boolean functions is calculated as,∑8
i=1(−1)f(i)⊕g(i)
28.28 = 0.75.
Table I shows the discrete correlation values and the cardi-
nality of the number of pairs which fall in a specific correlation
partition with respect to the function, B. 
It is worthy to note that each value in the correlation-spectra
corresponds to a distinct number of mismatches between a
pair of Boolean vectors. We thus formalize the notion of
correlation-spectra in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Given two m-variable Boolean functions f and g
with i mismatches (0 ≤ i ≤ 2m−1), the correlation coefficient
between f and g is given by,
Coeff(f, g) = 1− i
2m−1
(6)
Proof: Given i number of mismatches, the correlation coeffi-
cient between f and g can be calculated as,
Coeff(f, g) =
(−1)i+ (1)(2m − i)
2m
=
2m − 2i
2m
= 1− i
2m−1
which completes the proof. 
Lemma 2: Given the correlation coefficient Coeff(f, g), the
number of m-variable Boolean function pairs (f, g) having this
correlation coefficient is given by,
Count = (22
m
)
(
2m
2m−1(1− Coeff(f, g))
)
(7)
Proof: Given i number of mismatches, number of pairs (f, g)
having i mismatches is
Count = (22
m
)
(
2m
i
)
(8)
From Equation 6, we get i = 2m−1(1 − Coeff(f, g)).
Substituting i in Equation 8completes the proof. 
We can also calculate the probability of a pair p belonging in
a particular correlation bucket Ck by the following expression:
Prob[p ∈ Ck] = Count
22m × 22m =
(
2m
2m−1(1−Coeff(f,g))
)
22m
(9)
Now, for the Boolean function introduced in Example 1,
we calculate the correlation coefficient and the total function-
pairs which fall under the same correlation partition in the
following.
Example 2: Let us revisit the function B mentioned in
Example 1. Using Lemma 1, we compute the coefficient values
as, 〈−1.00, −0.75, −0.50, −0.25, 0, +0.25, +0.50, +0.75,
+1.00〉. Using Lemma 2, we compute the number of pairs
TABLE I
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF 3-VARIABLE BOOLEAN FUNCTION WITH
NUMBER OF FUNCTION PAIRS
Coefficient Mismatch Count Pair Count
-1.00 8 256
-0.75 7 2048
-0.50 6 7168
-0.25 5 14336
0 4 17920
+0.25 3 14336
+0.50 2 7168
+0.75 1 2048
+1.00 0 256
having a given coefficient value. We tabulate the entire result
in Table I. 
Figure 2 further depicts the correlation-spectra pictorially
emphasizing that there are clear partitions in the correlation-
spectra of pairs of randomly chosen Boolean functions. In the
next subsection, we show that the correlation-spectra is an
indicator of whether the functions under consideration indeed
belong to a random choice of mappings.
B. Estimating Correlation-spectra from a Sample
In the above section, we derived a global property of the
Boolean function space manifested by the discrete correlation
values. For an m-bit Boolean function, thus there are maxi-
mum 22m distinct possible functions. We next show a given
random sample of Boolean functions, say N << 22m also
exhibits this characteristic.
Figure 3 presents the probability distribution of finite
Boolean functions lying in discrete regions of the correlation
spectrum. It can be observed for the first 3 response bits, the
probability of a small set of DAPUF instances lying in those
ranges is comparable to the probability that we obtained from
Equation 9 theoretically.
Fig. 3. Probabilities w.r.t. Range of Correlation-spectra for a Random Sample
We next show that we can extend this characteristic for
random Boolean functions as a mechanism for testing PUF
instances.
C. Testability Analysis of PUFs
The fundamental property of a good PUF design is that it
exhibits randomness. Hence, a given sample of such good de-
signs is anticipated to exhibit the above described correlation-
spectra (refer to Figure 3).
Fig. 4. Flowchart Description for Testing Mechanism of Faulty PUFs
Figure 4 schematically represents the tests conducted on
PUF responses leveraging the correlation properties mentioned
in the previous subsection. For testability analysis of PUFs,
we have utilized statistical method such as Welsh’s t-test over
correlation spectra of multiple instances of 64-bit 5-4 DAPUF.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
We have divided our experiment in the following two parts:
• Evaluation of correlation among PUF instances using the
correlation-spectra, and
• Applying Welsh’s t-test on correlation spectra of correct
and faulty PUF to identify a faulty PUF among a set of
PUF instances.
A. Implementation Setup
We have used 64-bit 5-4 DAPUF3, shown in Figure 1, for
our experiments due to its good uniformity property. We have
used the hardware implementation of 5-4 DAPUF on Xilinx
Artix-7 FPGA. We have used a challenge sets, C comprising
of 10000 challenges and 50 instances of 5-4 DAPUF in
our experiments. We have taken 5 measurements for each
challenge and selected a reference response using majority
voting from the generated responses.
B. Correlation Results for PUFs
For uniqueness analysis of PUFs, we have taken 50 in-
stances of 5-4 DAPUFs. We have divided the experiment into
two parts:
• In the first part, we have generated responses of each
PUF instance using the challenge set C1 and generated
correlation spectra for the same
3From here on, we will refer it as 5-4 DAPUF.
• In the second part, we have created a similar correlation
spectra for a faulty PUF
Since here we are concerned solely with the uniqueness of
PUFs, so we have ignored the reliability measures. We have
computed the correlation coefficient for all four response bits
individually. For each response bit, we have calculated the
number of pairs of PUFs with the same correlation coefficient
value. Since there are large number of distinct correlation
coefficients spanning from −1 to +1, we have grouped the
coefficients into 256 buckets. The plots in Figure 5 show
the total number of PUF pairs having correlation coefficients
falling in each of the buckets.
For 64-bit 5-4 DAPUF, total number of input realizations
are 264, which means that the truth table for a single instance
of 64-bit 5-4 DAPUF will be of length 264, which is very
large. Since it is not possible to compute the outcome of
264 challenges, we have considered a challenge subset of size
10000 to obtain an analogy with Boolean functions. We can
see that even with a small subset, we are getting the same
correlation-spectra curve as we derive for Boolean functions.
Moreover, for all the bits, the peak of the curve is near zero
and the span is spread on both sides of the peak, which is
similar to the Boolean correlation-spectra which is symmetric
at Coeff = 0.
In the second part of the experiment, we have induced a
stuck-at-1 fault at the 10-th switch from the input end, in all
five chains. Like the previous experiment, we have calculated
the correlation for every pair of faulty DAPUFs and plotted the
correlation-spectra for each response bit, as shown in Figure 6.
It can be observed that for each bit, the curve is skewed to
the positive side of the correlation scale. This can be used
as a fault-detection method in 5-4 DAPUF. Moreover, It may
be noted that after injecting the fault, there were negligible
changes in the uniformity measure of the response bits, as can
be found from the high similarity percentages in Table II. In
this table, we have listed some PUF instances along with its
uniformity property before and after fault injection.
TABLE II
UNIFORMITY MEASURE OF CORRECT AND FAULTY 5-4 DAPUFS
PUF Uniformity Measures for Percentage
Instances Correct Instances Faulty Instances Similarity
1 57.10 53.34 93.42%
2 56.74 53.88 94.96%
3 59.66 54.29 91.00%
4 52.36 49.96 95.42%
5 54.98 54.46 99.05%
6 56.93 54.47 95.68%
...
...
...
...
C. Testability Results for PUFs
To understand the difference in correlation spectrum intro-
duced by a fault, we have computed part-wise t-value for
correlation spectrum of correct and faulty 5-4 DAPUF. Though
the nature of the correlation spectrum (as found from Figure 5
(a) for Response bit 1 (b) for Response bit 2 (c) for Response bit 3 (d) for Response bit 4
Fig. 5. Correlation-spectra corresponding to various Response Bits of Correct 5-4 DAPUF (for N = 50)
(a) for Response bit 1 (b) for Response bit 2 (c) for Response bit 3 (d) for Response bit 4
Fig. 6. Correlation-spectra corresponding to various Response Bits of Faulty 5-4 DAPUF (for N = 50)
and Figure 6) are diagrammatically similar, however there
exists a horizontal displacement (for e.g., shift in the median)
of the correlation spectrum produced by faulty DAPUF in-
stances. Due to this phenomenon, the cross comparison of the
correlation-spectra of correct and faulty PUF instances will
reveal the dissimilarity.
One of the standard way to explore such dissimilarity is to
conduct statistical correlation tests. We have computed Welsh’s
t-test and Kullback-Leibler Divergence metrics to understand
the difference better. In case of Welch’s t-test, we apply the
two correlation matrices (derived from the correct and the
faulty instances of 5-4 DAPUFs) and produce the t-values.
To foresee the impact of t-test, we have split the correlation
range into small segments and computed t-value for each
segment individually. For Kullback-Leibler divergence, we
have calculated the divergence of the faulty-PUF correlation
matrix with respect to the correct one.
Fig. 7. Cumulative t-values of 5-4 DAPUF over Correlation-spectra Segments
In Figure 7, we have shown segment-wise cumulative t-
value, considering one segment, then two segments, followed
till the whole spectrum is covered. It can be observed that
for the initial few segments, there is a drop in the cumulative
t-value which can be attributed to the the rising-edge of the
faulty 5-4 DAPUF correlation spectra. However, the interesting
point to note here is that there is measurable increment in
the cumulative t-values with increasing number of segments.
This high cumulative t-values for the response bits indicates
the potential dissimilarity among the correct and faulty PUFs.
Depending on the severity threshold limit (denoted as t0 in
Figure 4) that has been set for the t-test, the derived t-values
(above threshold-limit) act as an indicator for the faulty nature
of PUFs. The KL Divergence values for the four response
bits are 21.9, 27.1, 22.1 and 32.5 which is large enough to
distinguish between the two spectra.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented two methods for testability of PUFs
using spectrum of correlation coefficients and standard Welsh’s
t-test values. Using the first method, we can qualitatively
evaluate the goodness of a batch of PUFs even in the absence
of any golden reference PUF. In the second method, we can
judge the quality of PUF leveraging the statistical method
and comparing the Kull-Leibler Divergence value and t-values
for correlation spectrum of correct and faulty PUF responses,
against a threshold limit.
The spectral analysis based test leaves several future direc-
tions of work. It is often tacitly assumed that PUF ideally
provides uniqueness, because of the spectral pattern we can
quantize the number of pairs which are actually quite corre-
lated. So, this potentially gives a direction to quantize clusters
of PUF ICs which can work as unique fingerprints. On the
other hand, this analysis can also lead to the identification
of PUFs which correlate with each other but not with other
members, and thus can operate as twin-PUFs. Finding such
instances and studying their properties can eliminate the
requirement of CRP databases which is a major bottleneck
for PUF based authentication.
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